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A CAUSE OF ACTION, ANYONE?:
FEDERAL EQUITY AND THE PREEMPTION
OF STATE LAW
Henry Paul Monaghan*
I was not fortunate enough to have known Dan Meltzer well. I met
Danny only a few times. We had only the thinnest of correspondence. Of his
sterling reputation as a human being, I am of course fully aware. And I do
know his work—all of it—thoroughly. On that point, a mountain of encomiums would iterate only a simple thought: Dan was the gold standard in federal courts scholarship.1 It is, therefore, a special honor to participate in a
symposium to honor his memory.
In this very brief Essay, I focus on aspects of a topic on which both
Danny and I have written and on which our reasoning differed: federal court
authority, “sitting in equity,” to enjoin enforcement of state law on federal
preemption grounds. In a coercive action brought by the state to enforce the
state law, the federal act could of course be set up as a defense. Suppose,
however, that alleging “arising under” subject-matter jurisdiction,2 the plaintiff sues the appropriate state officials to restrain enforcement of the state
statute. Many such challenges are readily entertained on the merits, often
because these challenges have a firm statutory basis such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.3 But not all do. The Court has, however, asserted a more general,
freestanding equitable injunctive authority: “[A]s we have long recognized, if
an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the
court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions pre© 2016 Henry Paul Monaghan. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School. Special
thanks to Marie Killmond for research assistance.
1 I put to the side another area of his preeminence. Along with my colleague Peter
Strauss, Danny was the leading modern defender of the Legal Process School (my school!)
of legal interpretation.
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
3 E.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009) (holding that
Title IX does not preclude action alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination under
§ 1983); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) (“NLRA
granted petitioner rights enforceable under § 1983.”).
1807
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empted.”4 Yet, not all such non–statutorily based challenges succeed. In
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.,5 for example, the source of the preceding quotation, a divided Court just last term refused to entertain such a
challenge by participants in a federal funding program (healthcare providers) seeking more favorable state-set Medicaid rates for their services. That
result may or may not be sound, but to my mind what is most interesting is
the intriguing nature of the various opinions, particularly given the Court’s
unanimous opinion one term earlier in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc.6 Lexmark’s mode of analysis, if it takes firm root,
should significantly reshape long-embedded modes of thinking about standing, at least at the statutory level. These two decisions and their intersection
are the focus of this brief Essay.
I. OLD BASICS
For many decades law students have been taught that before a district
court may address the merits of a private litigant’s substantive claims, Article
III requires that the plaintiff satisfy a three-part, trans-substantive set of “constitutional standing” requirements—injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability7—as well as three additional “prudential” justiciability barriers.8 The
source of judicial authority to fashion this discretionary overlay has never
been made clear,9 but its content generally included a ban on the assertion
of both generalized grievances and third-party claims,10 as well as a demand
that the plaintiff’s injury fall “within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.”11
4 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (citing Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908)).
5 Id.
6 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
7 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 101 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (identifying
these requirements).
8 See id. at 156–58 (identifying prudential aspects of standing doctrine and discussing
Lexmark).
9 The authority to create such an overlay might, however, have been thought to
inhere in the discretion long associated with equitable and declaratory remedies. See, e.g.,
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282–88 (1995) (reviewing history of federal courts’
discretion in entertaining declaratory judgment actions). But citing the “virtually unflagging obligation” language of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976), the Court now seems eagerly determined to exercise all statutorily
conferred jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (2015); Lexmark, 134
S. Ct. at 1386.
10 The ban on generalized grievances was sometimes located in Article III. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 149 n.3. The ban on jus tertii claims has not in fact proved to be
very formidable. See id. at 161–68.
11 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 12 (2004)).
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Allen v. Wright12 is the casebook poster child for this body of doctrine. It
is a leading case in virtually every casebook that has a section on standing.13
But Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,14 decided in
1970, not Allen v. Wright, arguably is the doctrinal high-water mark. That
decision, however, appears much later in the casebook standing sections.15
And there is a puzzle about what it illustrates: statutory limits on article standing; prudential standing; the invention of the zone-of-interest standing limitations; the APA? Long familiarity with the decision has obscured its
intellectual importance.
In Data Processing, the Court said that standing is a matter distinct from
and anterior to the plaintiff’s merits claim:
The “legal interest” test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the “case” or “controversy” test, the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question. Thus the Administrative Procedure
Act grants standing to a person “aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.”16

What is perhaps insufficiently remembered now is that the Data Processing formulation constituted a sharp break from previous cases, in which the
Court frequently (but not always17) rejected any sharp distinction between
standing and the claim on the merits, especially in the statutory context.
That is, the earlier formulation, the “legal interest” test, asked whether this
plaintiff had stated a cause of action.18 As a leading administrative law
casebook puts it: “Standing is a modern jurisprudential concept. For most of
our legal history, litigation occurred principally within a private-rights model,
in which who could seek relief was not recognized as distinct from whether
the complaint stated a cause of action.”19
12 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
13 E.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 101–03 (including Allen v. Wright in first
group of cases on standing).
14 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
15 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 157 (where it now no longer even
appears as a principal case).
16 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964)).
17 This was especially true in constitutional cases. See for example Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922), and Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam),
two such challenges where the Court understood plaintiffs to assert nothing more than a
generalized grievance that the government was not being administered according to constitutional requirements.
18 A leading example of the merits-based approach to “standing” is Alexander Sprunt &
Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 259–60 (1930), which discussed how an action by competitors challenging regulatory action failed because competitors had no common-law right to
be free from competition and the relevant federal statute gave them no such right.
19 PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1207 (11th ed. 2011); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Constitutional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 347 n.44 (2015). For an early description of the
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The private-rights model included litigants asserting interests protected
by the common law and those secured by statute.20 In theory, therefore,
unless the plaintiff’s claim was too insubstantial to confer subject-matter jurisdiction,21 dismissal should be for failure to state a claim, not for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Data Processing has always struck me as a laconic, casually tossed off opinion. But it has stood for decades as a systemic judicial response to the emergence of federal-court litigants who could not be analogized to private parties
asserting rights protected by the common law—most significantly, to plaintiffs (like the Exceptional Child plaintiffs) who themselves are not the direct
subject of governmental regulation but who claimed injury arising from the
activities (or inactivities) of the modern regulatory state.22 However, the
Data Processing/Allen v. Wright constitutional/prudential framework has not
private-rights model, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–68 (1973).
While it is true that standing is a modern concept, the concern for a proper plaintiff is
a longstanding one. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (“[E]arly American courts . . . were well aware
of the need for proper parties . . . .”). For a very recent discussion, see generally Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The
Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015). These authors insist that from
the beginning of our constitutional history, “the local law of a particular sovereign . . .
determined the causes of action that its courts could adjudicate.” Id. at 638. Considerable
variation existed in “[t]he forms and modes of proceeding.” Id. at 637. The First Judiciary
Act, they claim, made causes of action “matters of local law,” and Section 34 required
federal courts to apply state law. See id. at 639. The grant of jurisdiction in equity and
admiralty was more complicated, but the authors insist that this grant, too, did not extend
to the creation of new causes of action. Rather, Congress “directed federal courts to apply
traditional causes of action in equity and admiralty.” Id. at 675. The authors do not identify a source of these “traditional causes of action.” Marshall Court decisions suggest that
the rules of decision came from England, “that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles.” Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 223 (1818).
“[T]he Courts of the Union have a Chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the judiciary
act confers the same Chancery powers on all, and gives the same rule of decision.” United
States v. Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819); see also HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 7, at 602–03.
20 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 234–37 (1988)
(discussing relationship between private-cause-of-action cases and standing cases and identifying the issue in both as “whether the particular plaintiff had a judicial right to enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant”).
21 See the line of cases stemming from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)
(“Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail
to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover”; the court also noted
that exceptions exist where the federal claim is “immaterial” or “wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.”). See Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455–56 (2015) (collecting cases). On
the ironic relationship between Data Processing and Bell v. Hood, see Fletcher, supra note 20,
at 235.
22 Non–common-law (non-Hohfeldian) plaintiffs would also include plaintiffs asserting constitutional rights for which there was no common-law analogue, such as the right to
vote.
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yielded anything like a unified theory.23 In fact, the Court’s standing jurisprudence has long drawn strident criticism as “unprincipled” along a wide
variety of perspectives (from that of low-level politics, to concealed merits
determinations, to unpredictability).24 I pass those criticisms here. Professor
Fallon’s recent comprehensive study, The Fragmentation of Standing, is for me
far more helpful.25 He maintains that “[r]ecent years have witnessed the
accelerated fragmentation of standing into a multitude of varied, complexly
related subdoctrines.”26 If one looks at discrete areas of law, however, he
observes that one finds considerably more consistency and predictability.27
This Essay is an effort to look at one such area, albeit a rather large and
important one: statutory standing. And I want to emphasize the importance
of the existence of a cause or right of action, an idea that until Lexmark had
been obscured by Data Processing’s description of the elements of constitutional and prudential standing.28
Before turning to Lexmark, however, one final point should be noted.
Richard Stewart characterized Data Processing as an “unredeemed disaster”
and he was by no means alone.29 But how much its conceptual shift actually
changed things on the ground I cannot say.30 Issues of “statutory stand23 The Court insists that its standing doctrine reinforces separation-of-powers principles and informed judicial decision-making. E.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138, 1146 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers
principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of
the political branches.” (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93
(2009))); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“At bottom, ‘the gist of the
question of standing’ is whether petitioners have ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
24 See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466–67
(2008) (collecting criticisms); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 125 n.21 (same).
Considerable specific criticism centered on the zone-of-interest test on the grounds that it
was erratically applied and was perhaps relevant only to interpreting Section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012), which was at issue in Data Processing.
See Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 319 (2004).
25 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2015).
26 Id. at 1061.
27 See id. at 1063. The Establishment Clause cases, however, do leave Professor Fallon
particularly unsatisfied. See id. at 1071–75.
28 So distinct indeed were these concepts that to this day every edition of Hart and
Wechsler places them in different chapters. Compare HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 101
(introducing section on problems of standing), with id. at 723 (introducing section on
rights of action to enforce federal statutes and to enjoin federal constitutional violations).
29 See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Standing for Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1550, 1569 (1979); see
also Fletcher, supra note 20, at 229 n.48 (agreeing and collecting other such criticisms).
30 Jessica Bulman-Pozen insisted on this point. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E.
Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 823 n.48 (2015) (collecting sources on
the distinction between the law in action and the law on the books).
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ing,”31 as Lexmark reluctantly but accurately denominated them, quickly took
hold, typically framed under the heading of prudential standing.32 Laid
bare, the end question often ultimately became, does this statute authorize
this plaintiff to sue? Lexmark itself provides an excellent illustration.
Lexmark, it was alleged, had committed trade libel against a component supplier of a Lexmark competitor. As it came to the Court, the question was one
of “statutory standing” under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.33 Specifically, did a supplier to a Lexmark competitor have a claim against Lexmark
for the “false or misleading” advertising proscribed by the Act? The Act
imposed liability “in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.”34 Despite this very capacious language, no
one, including the Court’s textualists, supposed that “anyone” injured could
sue.35 The courts of appeals had framed the relevant statutory narrowing
inquiry in terms of “prudential standing,”36 and a three-way circuit split
developed as to the appropriate standard. Acknowledging but describing the
prudential standing label as “misleading,”37 the Court granted review: “We
granted certiorari to decide ‘the appropriate analytical framework for determining a party’s standing to maintain an action for false advertising under
the Lanham Act.’”38 As we shall see, the Court greatly reshaped “the appropriate analytical framework for determining” who could sue in the federal
court.39
II. NEW BASICS?
Further analysis of our preemption topic should, I believe, now be
filtered through the prism of Lexmark’s (I hope) watershed and (I believe)
restorative decision. That decision drew wide notice because, writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Scalia’s opinion all but categorically held that no
judicially fashioned prudential standing barriers could exist for refusing to
exercise statutorily conferred jurisdiction.40 This was quite startling given
31 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4
(2014).
32 See id. at 1386.
33 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388.
36 See id. at 1386.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1385 (quoting Petition for Certiorari at i, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (No 12-873)).
39 Id.
40 See id. at 1388 (citation omitted) (“Just as a court cannot apply its independent
policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, it cannot limit a
cause of action that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.”); see also
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (strongly suggesting that
any notion of prudential ripeness will also be eliminated); Leading Cases, 128 HARV. L. REV.
291, 330 (2014) (“Lexmark calls the future viability of prudential standing into question”
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recent squarely contrary precedent.41 Moreover, all the Members of the
Court seemingly agreed that the ban on “generalized grievance” claims
inhered in Article III itself.42 With those striking aspects of the decision I am
not here concerned.
What is important for us is that Justice Scalia removed Data Processing’s
zone-of-interest test from prudential standing and merged it with the issue of
proximate causation. “Although we admittedly have placed that test under
the ‘prudential’ rubric in the past,” he said, “it does not belong there.”43 To
ask “[w]hether a plaintiff comes within ‘the zone of interests’” protected by
the law invoked is simply to ask “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”44 And that issue goes to the merits,
not to subject-matter jurisdiction.45
Several aspects of Lexmark strike me as noteworthy. First, in statutory
cases, Lexmark should significantly reduce fixation on the constitutional
dimensions of standing. To be sure, the standard three constitutional
requirements are formally retained,46 but those barriers are actually quite
thin. Increasingly, “statutory standing” will be the central focus: Does this
statute arguably provide this plaintiff with a cause of action? Causation and
redressability will be seen as going to the merits of the claim, rarely to subject-matter jurisdiction.47 The same may be true of injury-in-fact. Data
and “leaves little room for courts to refuse to adjudicate a case for lack of standing based
on prudential considerations.”).
For additional discussion, see S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 127 (2014) (arguing “debates over the classification of specific principles” about standing “mask underlying differences in judicial philosophy ”), and Mendoza
v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014), commented upon in Recent Cases, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1850 (2014), which discussed the D.C. Circuit’s articulation of the zone-of-interests
test following Lexmark not as a prudential standing issue but “as a statutory inquiry into
whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action,” id. at 1854. Lexmark’s lengthy footnote left
open the status of the formal barrier against third-party standing. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at
1387 n.4.
For me, many third-party cases in fact involve first party standing, Henry P. Monaghan,
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984), or the application of the valid rule and
severability doctrines, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 182 (citing Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1).
41 Most notably, Elk Grove United School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004), and
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685–86 (2013). Lexmark cited Elk Grove with
evident disapproval. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
42 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
43 Id. at 1387.
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 See id. at 1391 n.6 (noting that for subject-matter jurisdiction, only an “arguable”
cause of action is necessary).
46 See id. at 1386 (“[P]laintiff must have suffered or be imminently threatened with a
concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))).
47 See supra note 40 (discussing future of prudential standing doctrine following
Lexmark).
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Processing sought to fashion that issue as a non-normative “factual” one.48
Few will subscribe to that view as a general proposition. While some freestanding, common law–based concept of injury will continue to exist49 (i.e.,
the “right” to be free from direct regulation), many cases will turn on a different statutory question: Does a plaintiff not the direct subject of a regulation
nonetheless assert an injury within the protective ambit of the relevant federal statute? That is, of course, Lexmark.50
Second, the Court’s discussion of the APA is significant. Section 702
creates only a remedial right of action. For Justice Scalia, however, it was also
a directive with respect to understanding the scope of judicial inquiry into
the underlying statute: in APA-governed matters, courts should be generous
in identifying plaintiffs who can assert injury from agency breach of a regulatory duty.51 With such a sentiment, I am in full accord. The idea of a “right”
in the regulatory context is complicated. For common-law and some statutory plaintiffs (such as in Lexmark, which is essentially a trade libel suit), the
fundamental claim is one of a strong “right”: “I am entitled to win on these
facts.”52 In interest analysis terms, the plaintiff asserts that her interest is
sufficiently strong to overcome an ordinary utilitarian calculus.53 In the regulatory context of the modern administrative state, however, the claim of
right frequently takes a more limited form. It is simply a claim that the regulators must take into account plaintiffs’ substantive interests and not treat
them in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.54 Typical of such cases is
Michigan v. EPA,55 decided at the end of the last term. All nine Justices
agreed that the EPA had to take into account the costs imposed on the regulated parties. The Court divided over whether that had been done at the
48 Fletcher, supra note 20, at 230–31 (describing and criticizing that attempt).
49 See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132–33 (2015) (plurality opinion) (Justice Scalia
summarizing Blackstone).
50 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1377.
51 See id. at 1388–89 (quoting Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)) (noting that the test is not “especially
demanding,” is “lenient,” and is generous, barring only “marginally related” interests). My
colleague Gillian Metzger pointed out to me that even prior to Justice Scalia’s statement,
the zone-of-interest standard, when applied, excluded very few would-be-litigants.
52 This is the structure of a claim made by a common-law plaintiff, and in Lexmark,
which the Court treats as a federal common-law trade libel tort action. See Lexmark, 134 S.
Ct. at 1392, 1393–94 (discussing understanding of common-law tort of unfair competition
at time of adoption of Lanham Act and establishing proximate causation).
53 The “right” can be conceived of as a “trump,” or as simply excluding certain justifications for its infringement. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3101–02, 3124–25, 3146 n.243, 3157 n.292, 3168 n.345 (2015)
(describing and collecting sources). That is not, of course, to say that the claim of right
can never be defeated.
54 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and
the Traditions of Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1963 (2015) (quoting Richard
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1756
(1975)).
55 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
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appropriate stage in the regulatory proceedings.56 Recognition of such limited “rights” is inevitable given the regulatory complexities and imperatives of
regulation necessary in the modern administrative state.57 Whether assertions of these kinds of interests merit the characterization of “right” in other
contexts is not important here. They do here.
Third and finally, care should be taken with respect to the cause-ofaction terminology. As (then-) Professor Fletcher pointed out, the term is
“awkward . . . because it includes within its scope the two distinct questions of
defendant’s duty and plaintiff’s right to enforce that duty.”58 Indeed,
because of that confusion the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure substituted “a

56 Compare id. at 2709 (emphasis in original) (“Cost may become relevant again at a
later stage of the regulatory process, but that possibility does not establish its irrelevance at
this stage.”), with id. at 2715 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“EPA reasonably found that it was
‘appropriate’ to decline to analyze costs at a single stage of a regulatory proceeding otherwise imbued with cost concerns . . . .”).
57 I put to one side any discussion of the seductive concept of the “private Attorney
Generals,” which Judge Frank made fashionable in the early 1940s. See Associated Indus.
of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, Ickes v. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc., 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (referring to “non-official persons,
authori[zed] to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
powers” as “private Attorney Generals”). That was a fashionable legal concept in Supreme
Court jurisprudence during the middle of the last century. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 7, at 145–46 (collecting cases). For an argument that the case law was understood to
hold that Congress could create litigants who (unlike a competitor, for example) had no
concrete, personal interest in the litigation, see Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A
Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1147 (2009). For some, such a doctrine would pose
problems under the Take Care Clause. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 154; Leah
M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1351–54 (2015) (questioning,
but ultimately rejecting, arguments against the proposition that the “Constitution permits
Congress to decide to authorize an individual to bring suit in federal court for violation of
federal law”). This Court seems completely inhospitable to any freestanding notion of the
private attorney general. On the whole, the concept now seems to do limited work. That is
certainly true with respect to litigants who can insist, as in Michigan v. EPA, that the regulatory framework requires that their tangible, economic interests be taken into account. It
may have some explanatory power in the case of otherwise qualified Article III litigants.
These litigants could advance “public interest” claims in addition to claims related to their
own injury. For example, in litigation governed by the APA, a litigant with an arguable
cause of action for economic injury could assert the full range of reasons that the agency’s
action was invalid (e.g., environmental damage) even if the litigant’s own interest was not
compromised, at least if the agency action was not severable. Were it otherwise, the litigant
would not be regulated under a valid rule. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526
(2007) (holding that petitioners had standing to challenge EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition because “[t]he risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real,”
and “[t]hat risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they
seek”); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–65 (1997) (holding that the Endangered Species Act’s citizen-suit provision expanded standing to negate or expand the zone-of-interests test and allow for suit by plaintiffs alleging over-enforcement).
58 Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236.
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claim for relief.”59 But the ancient terminology has the tenacity of original
sin.60
Given the Janus-faced character of cause-of-action terminology, care
must be taken with respect to making some relevant subsidiary distinctions.
Here, I would insist on the general soundness of the traditional Legal Process
mode of analysis, asking whether the defendant violated any duty owed to
plaintiff as a primary right holder,61 and, if so, whether plaintiff had identified a remedial right of action from some source.62 (Hart and Sacks caution
against “the ease . . . which . . . allows a primary right to be confused with a
remedial right of action, which is a very different legal animal.”63) The substantive federal statute itself or § 702 of the APA64 might provide the requisite remedial right. The capacious § 1983 may be available if defendants are
state officials.65 Finally, a plaintiff may have an implied right of action,

59 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
60 See, e.g., Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (2015) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014).
61 Interestingly, in the area of private rights, Hart and Sacks treated the important
concept as primary duty, not primary right. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS 136–37 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter HART &
SACKS]. But they insisted in a footnote that the idea of a primary right “has an important
and highly distinctive role in the analysis of relations between private persons and officials.” Id. at 137 n.8. This claim was not developed. But the authors proved to be prescient. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 843–49, 1012–15 (discussing actions for
declaratory or injunctive relief on grounds of preemption, application of § 1983 to preemption claims, and supremacy clause as alternative basis for preemption claim). As I said
earlier, however, in the regulatory context the claim of right may be only that plaintiff’s
interests be taken into account. See id. at 11–12. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could, I
believe, transcend this framework, or more accurately it can be used to enforce immunities
as well as rights. But, as yet, that claim has not found a home in the Court’s implied-rightof-action jurisprudence. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
62 See HART & SACKS, supra note 61, at 137 (“A right of action is a species of power—of
remedial power. It is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative application upon a disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to
secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy.”).
63 They add:
[A] system of analysis which permits confusion between a primary claim to a performance and a remedial capacity to invoke a sanction for nonperformance is
dangerous at best. But Hohfeld and Corbin went further and encouraged this
confusion by seeming to suggest that the right and the right of action necessarily
went together so that if there was no right of action there was no primary right in
a genuine sense to begin with, and vice versa. Lots of people have tried to think
backwards in this way. It is the essence of clear analysis to see that it is backwards,
and instead to think frontwards.
Id. at 136.
64 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
65 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also supra notes 3, 61; infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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although (as we all know) the heyday of implying such rights has long since
passed.66
* * *
Once again, of course, how much the Lexmark reformulation will actually change results on the ground remains to be seen. Familiar and deeply
ingrained modes of thinking are not readily displaced. Moreover, one appellate court has indicated that the Lexmark change is only verbal, and there is
surely force to this point.67 But Lexmark’s mode of analysis should foster
clarity, and as my colleague Judge Lynch pointed out to me, it should reduce
the number of issues the courts will view as “jurisdictional.” Moreover, if the
Court’s mode of analysis takes hold, it should go a long way in restoring the
pre-Data Processing framework. But the migration of ideas and concepts may
take some time.68 Even on the Court itself! For example, does Lexmark’s
mode of analysis apply in constitutional cases? Data Processing explicitly
referred to the Constitution as well as to statutes applying the zone-of-interest
standard; Lexmark did not.69 In the Arizona Redistricting Commission
case,70 the Court’s major standing case last term, the Court, over the dissents
of Justices Scalia and Thomas,71 held that the Arizona Legislature had standing under the Elections Clause72 to assert that an Arizona constitutional
amendment creating an independent redistricting commission unconstitutionally excluded it from the process of redistricting seats for the House of
Representatives.73 The Court then went on to hold, 5-4, against the legisla66 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387–88 (2015), provides
the most recent example of a case in which the Court did not recognize an implied right of
action. See infra Part III. But did the Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), necessarily assume that the Electoral Clause
impliedly created a right of action? See infra Part III.
67 Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (commented upon in Recent
Cases, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1850 (2014)). While Lexmark seems to favor a generous approach
to the question of whether a statutory cause of action has been created, Perez recognized
that the zone-of-interest test “is not a demanding one.” Id. at 1016–17.
68 See for example the fine recent student note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256 (2015). The author decries treating causation
as an Article III matter in environmental cases, but as a merits issue in common-law toxic
tort cases. See id. at 2271–72. The writer, however, seems entirely unaware of Lexmark and
its potential application here.
69 Compare Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (referring to the “statute or constitutional guarantee”), with Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1386 (referring to “the law invoked” (quoting Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004))).
70 See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652.
71 Justice Scalia dissented, invoking the private-rights model of constitutional adjudication. For him, this case involved only a contest for political power between two political
bodies. Id. at 2694–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 See id. at 2665 (majority opinion); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § IV, cl. 1.
73 See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 (holding that the Arizona
Legislature had standing because the initiative “together with the Arizona Constitution’s
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ture on the merits. Issues of standing and the merits were distinct, Justice
Ginsburg said. Standing in “‘no way depends on the merits’ of the claim.”74
Lexmark was not mentioned.75 Nor was there any separate discussion of the
source of the Arizona legislature’s right of action.
Finally, a major constitutional question, which can be noted only in passing, has surfaced. Everyone understands that the term injury “in fact” has a
strongly normative component.76 To what extent does Article III limit congressional power to create a judicially cognizable injury? The recent grant in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins77 could shed considerable light on that issue. Plaintiff
Robins complained of a Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)78 violation by
defendant data broker.79 Defendant published inaccurate but not necessarily negative information on its website.80 Arguably, plaintiff suffered no tangible injury—thus a “no injury” case. But this federal statute (like many
other federal statutes) carried a statutory penalty for its violation, and the
Ninth Circuit held that “the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient
injury-in-fact to confer standing.”81 This reasoning is in tension with the
Court’s statement that “[u]nlike redressability[,] . . . the requirement of
injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed
by statute.”82 Certiorari was granted on the following question: “May Conban on efforts to undermine the purposes of an initiative . . . would ‘completely nullif[y]’
any vote by the Legislature, now or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a redistricting plan”
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–24 (1997))). The legislature could submit a
non-binding plan to the redistricting commission. See id. at 2661.
74 Id. at 2663 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
75 Neither, I might add, were the Fourth Amendment cases where the Lexmark merits
mode of analysis has long found a home. That is to say, in Fourth Amendment cases, the
Court almost invariably concludes that the litigant either states a cause of action under the
Fourth Amendment or he does not. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447
(2015) (in a challenge brought by hotel operators, holding that a municipal code provision requiring them to turn over registries to police on request violated the Fourth Amendment); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that petitioners who “asserted
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized” lacked “legitimate expectation of privacy”). In the First Amendment context
standing has played a more important role. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.
Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (finding that the respondents lacked standing to challenge a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act on First and Fourth Amendment grounds,
among others, because their “theory of future injury [was] too speculative”). But Clapper
would probably not read any differently if viewed as a failure to state a claim on the merits.
The same is true of Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436,
1440 (2011), which held that Arizona taxpayers lacked standing to assert Establishment
Clause challenge to state tuition tax credit.
76 See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 229–33 (“[T]he nature and degree of a person’s
injury . . . cannot be seen as a merely ‘factual’ question.”).
77 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).
78 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
79 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 2014).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 412.
82 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009).
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gress confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete
harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute?”83
In his justly admired essay, Professor Fletcher argued that “[s]o long as
the substantive rule is constitutionally permissible, Congress should have plenary power to create statutory duties and to provide enforcement mechanisms for them, including the creation of causes of action in plaintiffs who
act as ‘private attorneys general.’”84 Hart and Wechsler suggest a somewhat
different framework:
If standing reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum that authorizes
judges to measure the existence of injury in fact, causation, and redressability against a constitutional ideal of what constitutes a “case” or “controversy,” then the availability of standing may not depend upon the way
Congress defines new rights of action. If, however, standing turns on the
articulation of a legal injury, then Congress has greater leeway to define injuries and chains of causation that will create standing where none would otherwise exist.85

Putting aside Professor Fletcher’s now dubious reliance upon a private
attorney general theory,86 both authors advance attractive frameworks. But
they ignore the importance of a modern litigation elephant: the Rule
23(b)(3)87 monetary class action. Quite obviously, what drove the grant of
review was the class action dimensions of the Spokeo statute and of its numerous federal counterparts. Companies face enormous penalties for arguably
only technical, “no injury” violations of these statutes.88 This is a scenario
that will not sit well on a Court with a solid majority deeply hostile to aggregate litigation (particularly lawyer-driven small-claims litigation) that none83 Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892, No. 13-1339 (2015).
84 Fletcher, supra note 20, at 251; cf. John Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 78–81 (2014) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper
Clause vests Congress with power to resolve matters of governmental structure).
85 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 132–33.
86 For a discussion of the history and current status of the private attorney general
theory, see supra note 57.
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
88 Seventeen amicus briefs seeking reversal on the merits have been filed, most by
business organizations. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, SCOTUSBLOG (last updated Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/spokeo-inc-v-robins/; cf. Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp. LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding an order of
dismissal of a class action involving identity theft). The Seventh Circuit (Wood, J.) held
that the plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing requirements based on alleged future injuries, including loss of time and money spent to protect themselves against future identity
theft and fraudulent charges. Id. at 693–94. In January 2014, Neiman Marcus had
announced that the payment card data of 1.1 million customers may have been hacked.
See Elizabeth A. Harris et al., Neiman Marcus Data Breach Worse than First Said, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/business/neiman-marcus-breachaffected-1-1-million-cards.html. The Remijas class consisted of approximately 350,000
members. 794 F.3d at 690.
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theless involves aggregate claims that would result in substantial money
damages. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg noted the class action problem.
Both she and Justice Sotomayor, otherwise sympathetic to plaintiff’s claim,
suggested that class certification might be inappropriate.89
Lexmark is instructive here. It, after all, continues a focus that was dear
to Justice Scalia, namely, whether the plaintiff has alleged a concrete injury to
itself. For him, abstract interests in securing good government or government according to the rule of law were not enough.90 We know, however,
that Congress can create interests that the Court would on its own not find
cognizable, such as an interest in information.91 But do Article III and/or
the Due Process Clauses impose limits on the extent to which Congress (or
the states) can make actionable claims by private parties against other private
parties (not the government) for “no injury” statutory violations?92 While
Spokeo could be most interesting in that respect, arguments now presented to
the Court emphasize that the plaintiff had adequately alleged more conventional conceptions of injury-in-fact.93 Moreover, it is far from apparent that
unwanted dissemination of erroneous information in violation of FCRA constitutes a less substantial injury than unconsented receipt of a single text message in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,94 which also
carries a statutory penalty. Yet in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, decided after the
oral argument in Spokeo, every Member of the Court assumed that the latter
89 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015)
(No. 13-1339) (Justice Ginsburg inquired of respondent’s attorney whether there would be
“grounds to oppose certification of a class” if the Court held “Congress can give consumers
a right to redress for false credit reporting.”); see also id. at 62 (Justice Sotomayor framed
the question as whether “the class defined by Congress [was] sufficiently congruent with
tangible harm . . . to satisfy Article III.”). Harold Edgar called my attention to an opinion
by Judge Frankel in a case involving a technical violation of a federal statute that carried a
statutory penalty and counsel fees. Given the gross disparity between actual injury and
damages, Judge Frankel denied certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) on the ground that a class action was not shown to be superior to individual
lawsuits. Ratner v. Chem. Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (concluding superiority requirement not met because “allowance of this as a class action is
essentially inconsistent with the specific remedy supplied by Congress”).
90 Nor are they enough for the Court. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 126
(collecting cases).
91 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (“The ‘injury in fact’ that
respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain information . . . .”). Justice
Scalia dissented. Id. at 29–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 The state courts are not bound by the case-or-controversy limitations of Article III,
but they are bound by the Due Process Clause.
93 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892
(2015) (No. 13-1339) (arguing on behalf of respondent Robins that “his entitlement to
monetary relief as a consequence of that violation [of the Fair Credit Reporting Act] shows
he has the personal stake that Article III requires,” even if the Court does not find that the
“violation of the statutory rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act” itself “constitutes
injury in fact”).
94 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(1)(A) (2012).
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was a constitutionally cognizable injury.95 It will be interesting to see the
interplay between the class action dimensions of Spokeo-like statutes and the
content of Article III injury.96 Lexmark preserves a constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact, and “no injury” violations are problematic, as is the
existence of an unlimited power in Congress to create injuries.97
III. FREESTANDING EQUITABLE CAUSES

OF

ACTION

And yet, despite the current Court’s hostility to implied rights of action,
we have a longstanding tradition of suits against officers seeking equitable or
declaratory relief for alleged wrongful conduct. Many such suits have a firm
statutory basis. But others do not, and Exceptional Child is the latest in that
line of decisions.98 As Justice Breyer put it,99 this was a rate-setting case.
Healthcare providers in Idaho covered by Medicaid sued to require state officials to set more favorable rates for their services. Federal courts cannot be
invested with direct rate-setting authority.100 But, as Justice Breyer observed,
“[F]ederal courts have long become accustomed to reviewing for reasonableness or constitutionality the rate-setting determinations made by
agencies.”101
The healthcare providers alleged a violation of § 30(A) of the Medicaid
Act, which requires that a state Medicaid plan
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the
payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services
and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the geographic area.102

Plaintiffs sought an order “to enjoin petitioners to increase [their]
rates.”103 The Ninth Circuit held that the Supremacy Clause104 afforded the
healthcare providers a right of action to enforce the statute. The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed. In several separate opinions, the Court concluded that the Supremacy Clause provides only a rule of decision with
95 136 S. Ct. 663, 679 (2016).
96 Now, as it turned out. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). For a collection of materials on Congress and standing, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 132–60.
97 I do not here pursue the question of “no injury” violations in the state courts.
98 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1388 (2015).
99 Id. at 1388–90 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100 Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442 (1923) (finding that power conferred
on the District Supreme Court by the Public Utilities Law was legislative because “[i]t
brings the court much more intimately into the legislative machinery for fixing rates”).
101 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1389 (Breyer, J., concurring).
102 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (2012).
103 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1382.
104 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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respect to the priority of state and federal law. It is not a repository for rights
of action.105
The Court then went on to consider whether there was any other basis
for private enforcement of § 30(A). It found none. Section 30(A), of course,
conferred no express right of action. In a less-than-pellucid footnote, the
Court said that (had it been raised) § 1983 would have been inapplicable
apparently because § 30(A) did not confer a primary right.106 Finally, and to
no one’s surprise, the Court found that the Act did not confer an implied
right of action (no right was “unambiguously conferred”).107 The concurring and dissenting opinions made no real challenge to the parts of the
Court’s analysis—so far, so good.
This left only the freestanding “federal equity,” the real nub of the case.
And here every Member of the Court apparently assumed that a federal court
“sitting in equity” possessed a freestanding authority to enjoin enforcement
of the state conduct on preemption grounds. The portion of the opinion
addressing this issue consisted of a single sentence: “And, as we have long
recognized, if an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory

105 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383–84 (“The Supremacy Clause . . . certainly does not
create a cause of action.”). All the Members of the Court seem agreed on this point. See
id. at 1388 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Like all other
Members of the Court, I would not characterize the question before us in terms of a
Supremacy Clause ‘cause of action.’”); id. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), “giv[es] ‘life’” to the Supremacy Clause (quoting
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 (1985))).
106 Id. at 1386 n.*; see also supra note 3. The Court’s current jurisprudence asks
whether a federal statute creates a primary right for which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would provide
the right of action. See, e.g., Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002) (finding that
FERPA’s nondisclosure provision “fail[ed] to confer enforceable rights” under § 1983).
But the language of § 1983 is broader; it provides a remedy for the “deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989) (quoting § 1983). In fact, both the
Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment can be
viewed simply in terms of creating immunities from certain kinds of state regulation. Linguistically, this would seem to create the right of action so long as any of those conditions
were present. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 445 (1991) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978)) (holding that suits for Commerce
Clause violations could be brought under § 1983 and “recognizing that § 1983 ‘provide[s]
a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights’”); Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (stating that “deciding whether a federal right
has been violated” is necessary to determine availability of § 1983). But for me, § 30(A) is a
federal funding statute, far too open-ended to create “rights, privileges, or immunities”
within the meaning of § 1983. The most that § 30(A) could contemplate is APA-like
review, and § 1983 does not contemplate such limited review.
107 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1387–88 (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283).
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actions preempted.”108 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent fully agreed, albeit in far
more elaborate detail.109
At this point the Court effectively divided 6-3.110 Justice Scalia asked
whether “this suit can proceed against [the state officials] in equity.”111 No,
he concluded:
The power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful executive action is
subject to express and implied statutory limitations. . . . In our view the Medicaid Act implicitly precludes private enforcement of § 30(A), and respondents cannot, by invoking our equitable powers, circumvent Congress’s
exclusion of private enforcement.112

The “intent to foreclose” analysis, in turn, rested on two prongs.113 Justice Scalia first referred to the acts’ remedy of withholding of federal funds.
But (in light of the precedents) that alone was not determinative:
The provision for the Secretary’s enforcement by withholding funds might
not, by itself, preclude the availability of equitable relief. But it does so when
combined with the judicially unadministrable nature of § 30(A)’s text. It is
difficult to imagine a requirement broader and less specific than § 30(A)’s
mandate that state plans provide for payments that are “consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care,” all the while “safeguard[ing] against
unnecessary utilization of . . . care and services.”114

Speaking for four Justices, Justice Sotomayor concluded that there was
no implied preclusion. For her, accepting the Court’s premise the statutory
scheme nonetheless clearly lacked the necessary “detailed remedial scheme”
that would preempt other remedies.115
108 Id. at 1384 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908)).
109 Justice Sotomayor emphasizes the long history of such officer suits dating back to
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1390
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The tradition, as she says, is a strong one. But examined
closely, the older history provides infirm support for the tradition. Some of the history
rested on the jurisprudential order of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Some of
the litigation was focused on sovereign immunity, and some was based on diversity jurisdiction. Anne Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107
YALE L.J. 77, 99–111 (1997) (discussing nineteenth-century diversity cases involving constitutional issues). Justice Sotomayor seemed unaware of the transitional importance of
Young in impliedly creating “arising under” subject-matter jurisdiction for this freestanding
injunctive authority. Moreover, she places far too much emphasis on Ex parte Young. See
infra note 122. But, of course, the more modern case law solidly supports her. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 745, 844–45.
110 Justice Breyer’s solitary concurrence tracks the essentials of Justice Scalia’s analysis.
Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1388–90 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
111 Id. at 1385 (majority opinion).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(a)
(2012)).
115 Id. at 1390 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Exploration of the differences between the majority and the minority is
beyond the scope of this Essay. On the surface, they might seem narrow and
context-specific. But in the regulatory context, these differences may have a
considerable significance, representing as they do different judicial “moods.”
The majority seems increasingly unwilling to grant additional relief in the
context of a regulatory funding scheme that has its own significant remedial
provisions. That unwillingness is consistent with other decisions of the
Court.116
***
The entire Court’s search for some source for a right of action to
enforce § 30(A) seems to overlook a fundamental preliminary issue: Does
§ 30(A) confer any private primary rights, and if so of what kind? As noted,
Justice Scalia states, “It is difficult to imagine a requirement broader and less
specific.”117 I agree. For me, § 30(A) is far too open-ended, far too polycentric to talk about direct judicial enforcement of a primary right in the traditional common-law sense.118 The healthcare providers’ “right” seems to be
typical of the modern regulatory state: a right that regulatory authorities not
treat their interests in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.119 At the end of
the day, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent seems to contemplate no more than
APA-style review, which of course makes her dissent all the more formidable.120 But perhaps not ultimately persuasive, given the open-ended nature
of the statutory criteria.
Even assuming, however, that § 30(A) imposes an enforceable (APAstyle) primary duty, the next question is, what is the source of the federal
116 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 1014–15 (reviewing cases similar in this
regard).
117 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.
118 Compare this to Lexmark, which the Court treated as a federally authorized common-law trade libel suit. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1389–90 (2014) (holding that an allegation of injury to “commercial interest in
reputation or sales” is necessary to come within zone of interests in the Lanham Act, given
the background of the unfair-competition tort at common law).
119 Were § 30(A) read to contemplate direct, plenary rate-setting judicial enforcement,
I find it difficult to believe that a case or controversy would exist. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text (discussing precedent indicating that courts cannot be invested with
direct rate-setting authority). My only slight hesitation stems from the judicial enforcement of the Antitrust Act, which, as we know the Court recently acknowledged, is a broad
delegation to courts to fashion primary private law. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135
S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015) (stating that because the question in antitrust cases was
“whether the challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on
its understanding of economics” and that it was therefore appropriate for the Court “to
overturn the decisions in light of sounder economic reasoning”).
120 See Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1394–95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he broad scope
of § 30(A)’s language . . . counsels in favor of interpreting § 30(A) to provide substantial
leeway to States, so that only in rare and extreme circumstances could a State actually be
held to violate its mandate.”)
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courts’ freestanding equitable injunctive power?121 What federal law source
creates an affirmative right to sue? Or in Lexmarkian language, what law
creates the cause of action? The general grant of federal-question jurisdiction would now be thought not to be enough.122 To get a handle on this
puzzle, one must go back to the line of decisions associated with Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc.,123 all of which firmly assume that a federal court sitting in
equity could enjoin enforcement of a state statute on preemption grounds.
Justice Scalia himself was strongly wedded to that doctrine. In Verizon, for
example, he declined to consider the scope of a statutory right of action

121 As Langdell long ago pointed out, equity, like the common law, includes both remedial and substantive doctrines. See C.C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING xiv–xxii
(1877). This was extracted in the first six editions of Hart and Wechsler. A more truncated
version appears in the current edition. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 592.
122 The “modern” view seems to be that a grant of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction
does not by itself empower a federal court to fashion substantive law, including causes of
action. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981) (“The
vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to
formulate federal common law . . . .” (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973))); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 121–22 (1998) (describing the “fundamental requirement . . .
that a federal court fashioning common law ‘must point to a federal enactment, constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule’” (quoting
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 887
(1986))). But see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)
(concluding that the law to apply in suits under subsection of the Taft-Hartley Act is “federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws” (citing
Allan I. Mendelson, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66
YALE L.J. 167 (1956))). But that was not always the case. When Congress conferred general federal-question jurisdiction in 1875, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), the inclusion of
general equity authority resulted in a flood of litigation. The classic citation is, of course,
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902), a suit against a federal
postmaster. Even though no statute created a cause of action, Justice Peckham wrote that
“in case an official violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have
jurisdiction to grant relief.” Id. at 108. As my colleague Professor Merrill wrote,
After Congress created federal question jurisdiction in 1875, federal courts began
entertaining bills of equity that sought to enjoin allegedly unlawful administrative
action. They did so on the theory that federal courts needed only a grant of
jurisdiction, not a statutory cause of action, in order to exercise the powers of a
court of equity in ruling on a request to enjoin agency action.
Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 949 (2011) (footnotes omitted); see
also Duffy, supra, at 118–19 (“Equity had been federal judge-made law since the founding
of the Republic”). For earlier references to the same effect, see 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 307 (1st ed. 1958) (referring to injunction, before adoption
of the Declaratory Judgments Act, as “the mainstay for review of federal administrative
action”), and LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 193 (referring
to injunction as a “catchall”).
123 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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because the case fell within Shaw’s line of authority.124 An exhaustive study a
decade ago by Professor Sloss showed how entrenched this freestanding equitable doctrine had become.125 But no effort has been made to explain how
this body of doctrine can be reconciled with the Court’s other implied-rightof-action decisions. In Alexander v. Sandoval,126 also written by Justice Scalia,
we are instructed that “[r]aising up causes of action where a statute has not
created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for
federal tribunals.”127 Would the result in Sandoval, framed as a preemption
challenge to state executive misconduct, have been different had it been
framed as a suit alleging that a state constitutional provision was preempted
to the extent that it authorized certain executive action? Can enforcement of
state statutes be enjoined on preemption grounds, but not state executive or
administrative conduct?
Justice Scalia described the Court’s preemption injunction holdings as
“the creation of the courts of equity, and [they] reflect[ ] a long history of
judicial review of illegal executive action.”128 He cited Ex parte Young as the
source of the right of action.129 The history of officer suit injunctions—
which long predated Ex parte Young—in constitutional cases does exist, of
course.130 Hart and Wechsler instruct us in passing and without discussion
that Young also necessarily held by implication that such a right of action
existed (otherwise no federal court subject-matter jurisdiction existed).131
That, it should be noted, is a matter of constitutional construction (an infer124 See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (“Verizon
seeks relief from the Commission’s order ‘on the ground that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
must prevail,’ and its claim ‘thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.’” (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14)).
125 See David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355,
365–66 (2004) (noting that in nine “Shaw preemption cases” between 1996 and 2003, the
Court “reached the merits of plaintiffs’ claims without considering whether the allegedly
preemptive federal statute accorded plaintiffs a private right of action”). It remains axiomatic. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2013) (“Neither party has
questioned the District Court’s jurisdiction to decide whether federal law preempted the
[Iowa Utility Board’s] decision, and rightly so.”).
126 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
127 Id. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 365 (1991)).
128 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
129 See id.
130 See generally John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases,
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2013) (providing a discussion of the history of officer suit
injunctions).
131 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 891–92 (stating that since the Court in Ex
parte Young “upheld the authority of a federal circuit court to enjoin a state attorney general from instituting suits to impose sanctions for violation of a state statute that allegedly
conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment” it “plainly assumed that the plaintiffs had a
judicially cognizable cause of action”). That is to say, Young by implication and without a
word of discussion established a principle fundamentally important to our constitutional
order!
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ence from the Due Process Clause itself), not a “creation of the courts of
equity.” A parallel development has occurred with respect to implied rights
of action. When I started teaching, the Court’s approach to that issue was in
the mode of a common-law court. Over the course of time, (misguided?)
separation-of-powers concerns eroded that approach. Standard doctrine now
views implication as a matter of statutory construction, no longer the “creation of the courts of equity.”132
Moreover, Ex parte Young itself involved the implication of a right of
action for equitable relief from the Due Process Clause with respect to constitutional preemption: the statutorily prescribed rates were confiscatory. It is,
of course, entirely possible to extend Young’s “implication” to the enforcement of statutory as well as constitutional federal law. Preempted state law is
in the end “unconstitutional” state law. Danny Meltzer believed that Young
applied at the statutory level.133 But for me, (to invoke Holmes) that reasoning elevates logic over experience, that is, the actual history of the development of our ideas about affirmative access to the federal courts. Danny’s
colleague David Shapiro correctly observes, I believe, that Ex parte Young was
simply a part—an important marker, to be sure—in the longstanding struggle over the availability of affirmative federal remedies (a Lexmarkian cause
of action) against state conduct violative of federal law.134 The remedial consequences of violations of federal statutes can be seen to present issues different from violations of the Constitution,135 and Congress, it could be argued,
132 Cf. supra note 121.
133 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 36–41 (“Ex parte Young concerned not only the Eleventh Amendment but also
implied remedies for violations of federal law.”). He endorsed the Shaw v. Delta Airlines
line of decisions. Id. at 39 n.182 (listing cases).
In a truly laconic discussion, Hart and Wechsler also seem to ground the right of
action in the relevant federal statute, not the Due Process Clause. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 7, at 844. The authors write, “But insofar as Young recognized an implied cause
of action under the Due Process Clause, could the Court have refused to recognize a similar cause of action under a federal statute?” Id. Well, er, actually yes! Their reasoning
would mean that every federal statute has a built-in right of action for equitable relief
against state officials, but perhaps not against individual interference.
134 See David L. Shapiro, Ex parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 69, 86–87 (2011) (characterizing Young as part of “two gradual transitions: (1) from the
granting of relief against wrongs to tangible property to the granting of relief against the
constitutional wrong of enforcing an invalid law, and (2) from the development of remedies without concern over the source of law to the federalization, and even constitutionalization, of those same forms of relief”); see also id. at 94 (“[A]rguments about the case have
become a proxy for a more important debate: To what extent, if any, should federal law
(especially the Constitution) be available for use not only as a shield against state action
but as a sword . . . . Young is certainly not irrelevant to that debate, but its significance
should not be exaggerated.”).
135 See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception”, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 102 (1996) (discussing implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from
authorizing suit against state officials to enforce legislation enacted under Indian Commerce Clause).
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should have a major role in shaping affirmative remedies for federal statutory
violations. Not to labor the point here, but to extend Young beyond constitutional violations is a stretch for me, and it calls into question the Court’s
entire implied-right-of-action jurisprudence in the non-constitutional
context.136
I am therefore left with a puzzle. Shaw and its progeny do not seem to
cohere well with the Court’s general arising-under jurisprudence. But that
lack of coherence is not of constitutional dimensions. No issue of congressional power is implicated.137 It is enough to say here that a federal right of
action is not a constitutional prerequisite for arising-under jurisdiction.138
We focus here only upon those aspects of “arising under” jurisdiction where
the Court has fashioned its own jurisprudence.
Since for me the question has no real Article III dimension, continued
adherence to the Shaw line of decisions, whatever their correctness, must be
decided on some other basis. Having as I do a high regard for precedent, I
would adhere to Shaw. But the case for adherence is far stronger than that.
Shaw draws upon the longstanding, venerable, and important tradition of
officer suits that helps maintain rule-of-law values.139 No visible downside is
apparent to me, unless it be that of complexity. But complexity there is.
What exactly is the scope of Shaw? A suit is never brought “against the statute,” as Justice Scalia’s opinion fully recognized: it always is a suit to enjoin
executive officials from enforcing the statute. But in both Young and in Shaw
itself, the validity of the state statute was quite upfront. Not so in Exceptional
Child; the state statute was not at issue, only the particular state administrative
action taken under the statute.140 Much of the dicta in the recent cases sup136 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 745 (noting the numerous implied-right-ofaction decisions not discussed in the Shaw line); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal
Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 239–40 (1991)
(stating that “Shaw seems wrong, if read to permit any federal immunity holder automatic
access to federal courts for declaratory and injunctive relief” and noting that no federal law
gives persons with an immunity from state regulation a federal right to sue as plaintiff for
coercive relief). But see supra notes 124–25 (discussing the import of Shaw in light of the
Court’s recent decisions).
137 Thus, we need not explore the outer boundaries of congressional power to confer
jurisdiction simply because a matter of federal law might occur in the course of the proceeding. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 826–27 (1824) (finding
the statute authorizing the Bank of the United States to sue in federal court constitutional,
even where the suit “depend[s] in fact altogether on questions unconnected with any law
of the United States” because “[e]very act of the Bank grows out of th[e] law [creating the
Bank], and is tested by it”). For a collection of materials, see HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 7, at 784–806.
138 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 849–60 (noting that Congress, for example,
may authorize federal jurisdiction based upon the existence of a federal defense; or
because the defendant, not the plaintiff, possesses a federal right of action).
139 See supra note 122 (discussing the McAnnulty line of officer suit cases).
140 That sentence is also true of Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of
Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002), as Justice Souter’s concurring opinion, see id. at
649–53, demonstrates. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 845 n.3 (noting that Justice
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ports application of Shaw to these “as applied” challenges to state executive
implementation of facially valid state statutes. But what then of Exceptional
Child? Of Sandoval? Chief Justice Roberts takes a different tack: he is clearly
hostile to extending Shaw to the exercise of state administrative authority
pursuant to federal funding statutes. He would limit Shaw to cases in which
the plaintiff was a prospective defendant in a state coercive action.141 Why?
Why such a rigid bias in favor of regulated entities over regulatory beneficiaries insofar as equitable relief is concerned? As it now stands, the Court’s
implied-right-of-action jurisprudence could use someone to pull it together.
CONCLUSION
The question remains how best to understand the current body of doctrine, an understanding that respects both history and current practice. I
think that understanding would have three components.
First. The development of affirmative remedies against governmental
misconduct has had a messy history. Under our contemporary jurisprudence, however, such remedies would ordinarily require a cause of action,
and their creation would be seen as largely a matter for Congress.
Second. There is a longstanding and vastly important qualification of
the foregoing statement: the tradition of an equitable cause of action in
officer suits. That tradition has its roots in the English law brought forward
into American law often without any analysis—close or otherwise—of its
potentially shifting doctrinal basis in the evolving and changing American
jurisprudence. Justice Scalia was right to say that the cause of action (I would
prefer “right of action”) is a creation of the federal court of equity.
Third. Ex parte Young fits very comfortably within the officer suit tradition, that is, a creation of the court of equity. Young itself simply assumes
judicial authority to issue such injunctions, and many authorities do not
stress its constitutional origins.142 Hart and Wechsler, however, have always
Souter’s concurrence correctly identified the claim at issue in Verizon: “‘[T]he Maryland
Public Service Commission has wrongly decided a question of federal law under a decisional power conferred by’ a federal statute” (quoting Verizon, 535 U.S. at 650 (Souter, J.,
concurring))).
141 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing respondents should not have standing because they “are not
subject to or threatened with any enforcement proceeding” but rather “seek a private
cause of action Congress chose not to provide”); cf. The Supreme Court—Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 145, 217–20 (2015) (arguing that the best explanation
for the doctrinal confusion regarding implied rights of action is that they “are all federal
common law,” and that the outcome in Armstrong forecasts that “the bifurcation between
affirmative and negative relief is a more permanent fixture in the private-rights-of-action
landscape,” where the Court will more readily find affirmative injunctive remedies displaced by statutory text but may be more permissive about implying negative injunctive
remedies from federal statutes).
142 See Duffy, supra note 122, at 124 (stating that with the McAnnulty Court, the “right
to relief was thus cut from the fabric of equity” and that the “Court did not require any
statutory authorization for the remedy other than the statutory grant of equity jurisdic-
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viewed the Young cause of action as a matter of constitutional interpretation.143 On balance, I would adhere to Hart’s and Wechsler’s understanding. No advantage appears in rejecting a constitutional foundation for
Young, and attempting to recast it will only add to doctrinal complexity.

tion”); Merrill, supra note 122, at 986–87 (“Article III pointedly specifies that the judicial
power extends to all cases ‘in Law and Equity’ and courts sitting in equity characteristically
issue prospective orders.” (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2)). But see
Shapiro, supra note 134, at 86, 89–90 (footnote omitted) (recognizing “strong support for
understanding the case as a step in the evolution of an action for equitable relief based
solely on the notion of remedy rooted in (or at least derived from) the Constitution,” but
also acknowledging John Harrison’s argument that “Constitutional rules limiting government . . . have their own remedial apparatus: ‘invalidity and nothing more,’ not damages
and not injunctive relief. And Young does not contain any implication to the contrary
since the anti-suit injunction ‘rested on ordinary principles of equity.’” (quoting John Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1020, 1022 (2008))).
143 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 75, 810, 891–92.

